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Taking care of your own: 
Ethnic and religious polarization and income inequality 
 
1. Introduction 
 Several empirical studies, based on cross country regressions, such as, Alesina et al. 
(2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that ethnic and religious heterogeneity 
generate conflicts leading to poor quality of institutions, poorly designed policies and poor 
growth performances. Alesina et al. (2003), for example, measure heterogeneity by using a 
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where ijn  is the population share of group j in country i. The fractionalization index gives us 
the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to two different 
ethnic or religious groups. It reaches a maximum if every individual in a country belongs to a 
different ethnic or religious group. Alesina et al. (2003) find that going from complete ethnic 
homogeneity to complete ethnic heterogeneity decreases the growth rate of income by almost 2 
percentage points. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2000, 2005), on the other hand, use a 
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PI is an index that measures the distance of any distribution of ethnic and religious groups from 
the situation that leads to the maximum conflict. The closer is the distribution of religious and 
ethnic groups in a country the higher is the PI. In a country with three ethnic or religious groups 
distributed with percentages 45, 45 and 10, the index and hence the likelihood of conflict is 
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higher than with the percentages 34, 33 and 33 or with 90, 10, 0 (Reynal-Querol and Montalvo 
2000, and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). In contrast to FI, PI reaches a maximum when 
there are two religious or ethnic groups of equal size in a country. They find that going from 
complete homogeneity to complete heterogeneity decreases the growth rate of income by 
almost 1 percentage point.  
 Ethnic and religious heterogeneity not only affect the growth rate of income, they also 
affect income inequality both directly and indirectly. First, as Glaeser (2005) argues, ethnic 
heterogeneity causes skill inequality. “Skill inequality seems to come mostly from juxtaposition 
of ethnic groups with different educational traditions ... (Glaeser 2005, 6)” Protestant churches, 
for example, as opposed to Catholic church, traditionally encourage education to increase 
familiarity with the Bible (Glaeser 2005). Second, ethnic heterogeneity limits the tendency to 
redistribute income. According to Alesina and Glaeser (2004), this is because individuals who 
belong to one ethnic group are less willing to support redistribution helping other ethnic groups. 
The members of different ethnic groups simply view one another as direct competitors for 
scarce economic resources (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, Bobo and Hutchings 1996).  
 There are several empirical studies which investigate the effects of ethnic heterogeneity 
on redistribution channels using micro data. Luttmer (2001), for example, uses survey data to 
investigate the determinants of individual support for welfare programs in US and finds strong 
empirical evidence showing a clear pattern of ethnic group loyalty. He finds that, an additional 
black welfare recipient reduces support for welfare by non-black respondents but has little 
effect on black respondents. Conversely, an additional non-black welfare recipient reduces 
black support for welfare but has little effect on non-black support. Again using survey data, 
Okten and Osili (2004) investigate the determinants of contributions in Indonesia to community 
organizations, another important redistribution channel, and find similar results. They find that 
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households are less likely to contribute to community organizations if they belong to a non-
majority group. Their results partially support Alesina and La Ferrara’s (2000) hypothesis that 
the members of the non-majority ethnic group derive positive utility from interacting with the 
members of the same ethnic group and negative utility from interacting with the members of the 
majority ethnic group. Among the few studies using macro data, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) 
find that ethnic fractionalization reduces support for welfare programs across countries.  
 Although the above mentioned studies present persuasive evidence regarding the effects 
of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on redistribution of income and channels of redistribution, 
to our knowledge there are no studies attempting to find the magnitude of the direct and indirect 
effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income inequality. In other words, there are not 
any studies attempting to answer such questions as: how many percentage points of the 
difference in Gini coefficients between two countries or two states are explained by ethnic and 
religious heterogeneity? 
 In this study, we first analyze the direct effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on 
income inequality, using both of the aforesaid polarization and fractionalization indices and 
data for 50 US states. As Bobo and Hutchings (1996) argue, due to ongoing immigration from 
Asia, South America and Central America and the earlier internal migration of African 
Americans, most, if not all, of the states in the US today are significantly multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious conglomerations. The average value of the ethnic (religious) polarization index 
for 1980 and 1990 is 0.48 (respectively, 0.58) and the average value of the ethnic (religious) 
fractionalization index for the same years is 0.28 (respectively, 0.69) across 50 states. US states 
provide an ideal setting to analyze the effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity since there 
are much better and more comparable data on ethnic and religious heterogeneity as well as on 
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such control variables as unemployment insurance, minimum wage, and unionization rate than 
across countries (Alesina and LaFerrara 2005). 
 We find a linear and positive relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity 
and income inequality when we use the polarization index as our measure of heterogeneity. 
According to our seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates, going from complete ethnic 
(religious) homogeneity (an index of 0) to complete ethnic (religious) heterogeneity (an index 
of 1) increases the Gini coefficient by almost 3 (respectively, 3) percentage points. When we 
use the fractionalization index as our measure of heterogeneity, we find inverse-U shaped 
relationships between both ethnic and religious heterogeneity and income inequality. In other 
words, we find that there are inequality maximizing levels of fractionalization. According to 
our SUR estimates, the Gini coefficient is maximized when ethnic (religious) fractionalization 
is equal to 0.62 (respectively, 0.54). 
 Second, we analyze the indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income 
inequality, by focusing on their effects on welfare programs using macro data. One of the 
biggest welfare programs in the US is the AFDC/TANF (Aid to the Families with Dependent 
Children/Temporary Assistance to Needy Families) scheme. The results of the SUR estimation 
for AFDC/TANF scheme mirror those pertaining to the relationship between ethnic/religious 
fractionalization/polarization and the Gini coefficient. We find linear and negative relationships 
between ethnic and religious polarization indices and AFDC/TANF payments and U-shaped 
relationships between ethnic and religious fractionalization indices and AFDC/TANF payments. 
According to our estimates going from complete ethnic (religious) homogeneity to complete 
ethnic (religious) heterogeneity causes monthly AFDC/TANF payments to decrease by $196 
(respectively, $208). AFDC/TANF payments are minimized when ethnic (religious) 
fractionalization is equal to 0.50 (respectively, 0.63). 
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 The study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data on ethnic and religious 
heterogeneity as well as on the control variables. Section 3 presents the results of the SUR 
estimation and discusses the direct and indirect effects which ethnic and religious heterogeneity 
have on income inequality. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
  The data we use to calculate the ethnic polarization and fractionalization indices 
(henceforth EPI and EFI) are from the Census Bureau for the two years 1980 and 1990, and for 
six ethnic groups: Hispanics, Whites, Blacks, American Indian and Eskimos, Asians, and 
Others. The data we use to calculate the religious polarization and fractionalization (henceforth 
RPI and RFI) indices are from the American Religion Data Archive for the same two years. 
These data are collected by representatives of the Association of Statisticians of American 
Religious Bodies to provide information on the number of churches and adherents for 111 
Judeo-Christian church bodies for 1980 and 133 Judeo-Christian church bodies for 1990. For 
consistency, we exclude the church bodies which are not covered in both time periods. The 
adherent totals of the religious groups include almost 50% of the total population in both time 
periods. Unfortunately, we do not have data on other religious groups such as Muslims and 
Hindus, nor on non-religious groups. Nevertheless, since the Muslim population is estimated to 
be lower than 1 percent of the total population and the Hindu population is estimated to be even 
lower than that, we do not believe that missing information on such religious groups is critical 
for our study. According to the National Survey of Religious Identification (NSRI) conducted 
in 1990 by Barry A. Kosmin, Seymour P. Lachman and associates at the Graduate School of the 
City University of New York, the Muslim population is estimated to be 0.5 percent of the total 
population, whilst the Buddhists account for 0.4 percent, the Unitarian Universalists 0.3 
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percent, and the Hindus 0.2 percent. Non-religious groups are estimated to be 7.5 percent of the 
total population.   
 Taking the polarization indices first, we find that, among the four census regions, the 
South is the most polarized, both ethnically and religiously: EPI is maximal equal to 0.91 in 
Mississippi, and RPI is maximal and equal to 0.79 in Louisiana (these are averages across the 
two years 1980 and 1990). The least ethnically polarized region is Northeast: EPI=0.06 in 
Vermont. West is the least religiously polarized region: RPI=0.30 in Utah. Not surprisingly, 
there is a significant correlation between EPI and RPI: the correlation coefficient is equal to 
0.36. Figure 1 shows the relationship between EPI and RPI for 50 states averaged across the 
two years 1980 and 1990.  
 Turning to the fractionalization indices, we find that the South is the most ethnically 
fractionalized region while Midwest is the least so: EFI=0.47 in Mississippi, and EFI=0.07 in 
Iowa, one of the least ethnically fractionalized states. Surprisingly, the most religiously 
fractionalized region is Midwest: RFI=0.84 in Iowa. Northeast is the least religiously 
fractionalized region: RFI=0.29 in Rhode Island. The correlation between EFI and RFI is 
negative and quite low: the correlation coefficient is equal to -0.06. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between EFI and RFI for the same 50 states and the same two years as used in the 
construction of Figure 1. 
 The relationship between the polarization and fractionalization indices is quite 
important. As mentioned earlier, PI reaches a maximum when there are two religious or ethnic 
groups of equal size in a country. FI, on the other hand, increases with the number of groups. 
Figure 3 is taken from of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and shows FI and PI as 
functions of the number of groups (assumed of equal size). Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the 
relationships we find between EPI and EFI, and between RPI and RFI respectively for 50 US 
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states. These plots are quite similar in nature to those to be found in Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) for 138 countries. For low levels of fractionalization, PI and FI are highly and 
positively correlated. For medium levels of fractionalization, the correlation is zero, and for 
high levels of fractionalization it is negative. Figures 4a-4d and 5a-5d show the relationships 
between EPI and EFI and between RPI and RFI in 4 census regions, respectively. Although the 
relationship between EPI and EFI does not change significantly across regions, the one 
between RPI and RFI does. In the Midwest, the most religiously fractionalized region, there is a 
negative relationship between RPI and RFI while in the Northeast, the least fractionalized 
region, there is a positive relationship between the two. It is not surprising, then, to observe that 
the relationship between fractionalization and income inequality and the relationship between 
polarization and income inequality are rather different.  
 To measure income inequality across states we use Gini coefficients given by the 
Census Bureau for 1989 and 1999. Based on the averages across the two years Alaska has the 
lowest Gini coefficient and Texas the highest. The states with 5 lowest and highest Gini 
coefficients as well those with 5 lowest and highest religious/ethnic 
polarization/fractionalization indices are given in Table 1. As expected, the correlations 
between EPI and the Gini coefficient and between RPI and the Gini coefficient are positive: the 
correlation coefficients are 0.55 and 0.39, respectively.  Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the 
positive relationships between the polarization indices and the Gini coefficient. The 
relationships between the fractionalization indices and the Gini coefficient, on the other hand 
have inverse-U shapes as shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9.  The correlation coefficient between 
EFI and the Gini coefficient is 0.45 and that between RFI and the Gini coefficient is -0.08. 
Pairwise correlations of the fractionalization and the polarization indices and the Gini 
coefficient are given in Table 2.  
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We include a set of control variables in our regressions to minimize the omitted variable 
bias. First, following Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2005), we include a set of government policy 
variables: Minimum Wage, Unemployment Insurance, and AFDC/TANF. Our Minimum Wage 
data are from Neumark and Nizalova (2004). Both Unemployment Insurance and AFDC/TANF 
data are from the Green Book (Background Material and Data on Major Programs within the 
Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means). We use real values of the hourly minimum 
wage, weekly maximum unemployment insurance benefits and the maximum monthly benefits 
for a single parent three person families covered under the AFDC/TANF scheme.  Second, we 
include two macroeconomic variables: average growth rate of real per capita Gross State 
Product (GSP) and the unemployment rate (Unemployment Rate) each averaged across the two 
sub-periods 1980-1989and 1990-1999. The GSP data are from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) and the unemployment data are from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Third, 
again following Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2005) we include a set of demographic variables: the 
percentage of female headed families (Female Head), the percentage of the population under 
age 18 (Young), the percentage over age 65 (Old), and the percentage of the population age 25 
and above with a college degree or more education (College). As Glaeser (2005) argues, 
stronger unions generally mean increased equality. Hence we include the unionization rate 
(Union) as another control variable using the estimates provided by Hirsch, Macpherson, and 
Vroman (2001). Finally, following Li et al. (2000) and Gupta et al. (2002) we include 
Corruption as our last control variable. Both of the studies find strong empirical evidence of a 
positive relationship between inequality and corruption.1 As our measure of corruption, we use 
                                                 
 1 Tanzi (1995) argues that, corruption is a factor distorting the redistributive role of government. Since 
only the better connected individuals get the most profitable government projects, it is less likely that the 
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the number of government officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. The 
data are from the Justice Department’s “Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of 
the Public Integrity Section”. These data are used by several studies such as Goel and Rich 
(1989), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fredriksson, List and Millimet (2003) and Glaeser and Saks 
(2004) to measure corruption across states. The summary statistics for all of these variables are 
given in Table 3.  
 
3. Results 
Polarization and Inequality: Direct Effects 
 Our basic model is as follows: 
Ginis,t1 = Interceptt1 + β1 EPI/RPIs,t1 + β2 Xs,t1 + εs,t1 
 Ginis,t2 = Interceptt2 + β1 EPI/RPIs,t2 + β2 Xs,t2 + εs,t2. 
where Ginis,t represents the Gini coefficient in state s during period t. EPI/RPIs,t represents the 
ethnic/religious polarization index and Xs,t represents the set of control variables that affect 
income inequality (Female Head, Young, Old, College, Minimum Wage, AFDC/TANF, 
Unemployment Insurance, Unemployment Rate, Union, Corruption, and regional dummy 
variables South, Midwest, and West). We estimate our model using SUR. SUR is a flexible form 
of Random Effects (RE) estimation and is widely used in cross country growth regressions 
since it allows for the error terms to be correlated across periods (Alesina et al. 2004, Alesina 
and La Ferrara 2005). We first formulate a separate regression for each period, then constrain 
                                                                                                                                                           
government is able to improve the distribution of income the more corruption there is. In other words, “the benefits 
from corruption are likely to accrue to the better connected individuals … who belong mostly to high income 
groups” (Gupta et. al. 2002, 23).  According to Jonston (1989), corruption favors the ‘haves’ rather than the ‘have 
nots’ particularly if the stakes are large. 
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the coefficients to be equal across periods and estimate the resulting system by generalized least 
squares (GLS). If the error terms are not correlated there is no payoff to GLS estimation-GLS is 
then simply equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS). The greater the correlation of 
the error terms, the greater the efficiency gain accruing to GLS (Greene 2003). In our 
regressions, the correlation coefficient of the error terms across periods is higher than 0.70.2 
The results of the SUR estimation for the individual effects of ethnic and religious 
polarization on income inequality are given in the first two columns of Table 4. The estimated 
coefficients of EPI and RPI are both positive and significant at the 1 percent  and 10 percent 
levels respectively, indicating a strong positive relationship between ethnic and religious 
heterogeneity and income inequality. As the results given in Table 4 suggest, going from 
complete ethnic (religious) homogeneity (and index of 0) to complete ethnic (religious) 
heterogeneity (an index of 1) increases the Gini coefficient by almost 3 (respectively, 3) 
percentage points. Up to 2.4 percentage points of the difference in Gini coefficients (almost 25 
percent of the difference) between Vermont and Mississippi is explained by the different 
degrees of ethnic polarization in those states, and up to 1.3 percentage points of the difference 
in Gini coefficients (almost 20 percent of the difference) between Utah and Louisiana is 
explained by different degrees of religious polarization. The third column of Table 4 gives the 
results of the SUR estimation when EPI and RPI are used together. Again the estimated 
coefficient of EPI is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated coefficient of 
RPI is positive and almost significant at the 10 percent level. The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients slightly decreases when we use EPI and RPI together. The estimated coefficient of 
EPI decreases from 0.029 to 0.026 and that of RPI from 0.029 to 0.018. 
 
                                                 
 2 The results of RE estimation are very similar to those of the SUR estimations reported here. 
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Fractionalization and Inequality: Direct Effects 
As mentioned earlier, FI increases with the number of groups. On the other hand, 
according to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), ethnic and religious fractionalization do not 
necessarily increase social conflict: we are, in fact less likely to observe social conflict in highly 
homogeneous and highly heterogeneous countries; increases in heterogeneity, after some point, 
decrease the effect of an individual ethnic or religious group on redistribution. If this is indeed 
the case, we should see an inverse-U shaped relationship between the fractionalization indices 
and the Gini coefficient and there should be an inequality maximizing level of fractionalization. 
To capture the presence of such a relationship we modify our basic model as follows: 
Ginis,t1 = Interceptt1 + β1 EFI/RFIs,t1 + β2 EFI/RFI2s,t1 + β3 Xs,t1 + εs,t1 
 Ginis,t2 = Interceptt2 + β1 EFI/RFIs,t1 + β2 EFI/RFI2s,t2 + β3 Xs,t2 + εs,t2. 
The results of the SUR estimation for the individual effects of ethnic and religious 
fractionalization on income inequality are given in the first two columns of Table 5. The 
estimated coefficients of EFI and RFI are positive and significant at the 1 percent and 10 
percent levels respectively, and the estimated coefficients of EFI2 and RFI2 are negative and 
both are significant at the 5 percent level. This does indeed indicate an inverse-U shaped 
relationship between the fractionalization indices and the Gini coefficient. All else constant, the 
Gini coefficient is maximized when EFI=0.62 and when RFI=0.54 which fall well within the 
range of observed values of EFI (0.03; 0.90) and RFI (0.18; 0.87). The third column of Table 5 
gives the results of the SUR estimation when ethnic and religious fractionalization indices are 
used together. The estimated coefficients of EFI and RFI continue to be positive and the 
estimated coefficient of EFI is significant at 1 percent level. The estimated coefficients of EFI2 
and RFI2 continue to be negative and the estimated coefficient of EFI2 is significant at 5 percent 
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level. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients changes slightly. When we use ethnic and 
religious fractionalization indices together, the estimated coefficient of EFI increases from 
0.095 to 0.096 and that of RFI decreases from 0.108 to 0.081. The estimated coefficient of EFI2 
decreases from -0.077 to -0.088 and that of RFI2 increases from -0.100 to -0.080.3 
Our results about the effects of macroeconomic and demographic variables on income 
inequality are mostly consistent with the earlier studies. The estimated coefficients of 
Unemployment Rate, GSP Growth, Female Head, Old, and Corruption are significant in almost 
all estimations. We find that increases in Unemployment Rate increase the Gini coefficient. The 
higher the percentage of female headed families, and the higher the percentage of the 
population over 65, the higher is the income inequality (Wu, Perloff, and Golan 2005). GSP 
Growth has an equalizing effect while Corruption tends to increase the income inequality (Li et 
al. 2000, and Gupta et al. 2002). Among the government policy variables, only the coefficient 
of AFDC/TANF is significant. We find that AFDC/TANF payments decrease the Gini 
coefficient.4 
Fractionalization, Polarization, and Inequality: Indirect Effects  
 One of the reasons why ethnic and religious heterogeneity affect income distribution is 
that they affect the channels of redistribution such as welfare programs. Using data on 
AFDC/TANF payments for 50 US states, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) find a negative 
relationship between the percentage of the black population in a state and the level of 
AFDC/TANF payments, and they conclude that ethnically heterogeneous states of the south in 
                                                 
 3 We do not report the estimated coefficients of EPI2 and RPI2 since they are not statistically significant in 
any specification.  
 4 Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2005) do not find a significant relationship between the AFDC/TANF payments 
and income inequality. 
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US are much less generous than their more homogeneous counterparts. As Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) argue, the AFDC/TANF is perhaps the largest welfare scheme in US. In our regressions 
we find a negative relationship between the AFDC/TANF payments and the Gini coefficient 
which is significant at the 5 percent, sometimes 1 percent level, indicating that the program is in 
fact a successful redistribution channel. It now becomes natural to ask if the fractionalization 
and the polarization affect the AFDC/TANF payments as they affect the Gini coefficient. The 
results of the SUR estimation are given in Table 6 and Table7.  
 Regarding polarization, the estimated coefficients of EPI and RPI are negative and 
significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent levels respectively, although the estimated 
coefficient of RPI loses its significance when we use EPI and RPI together. Alesina and 
Glaeser (2004) find that if the percentage of the black population in a state rises from 0 to 20 
percent, the monthly AFDC/TANF payment declines by $151. We find that going from 
complete ethnic homogeneity to complete ethnic heterogeneity causes the monthly 
AFDC/TANF payment to decrease by $196 and going from complete religious homogeneity to 
complete religious heterogeneity causes it to decrease by $208. Up to $165 of the difference in 
monthly AFDC/TANF payment (almost 35 percent of the difference) between Vermont and 
Mississippi is explained by the different degrees of ethnic polarization in those states, and up to 
$95 of the difference in monthly AFDC/TANF payment (almost 50 percent of the difference) 
between Utah and Louisiana is explained by different degrees of religious polarization. As for 
fractionalization, the estimated coefficients of EFI and RFI are negative and significant at the 1 
percent and 10 percent levels respectively; and the estimated coefficients of EFI2 and RFI2 are 
positive an significant at 1 percent and 10 percent levels respectively, although the coefficients 
of RFI and RFI2 lose their significance when we use both ethnic and religious fractionalization 
indices at the same time. In other words, we find U-shaped relationships of ethnic and religious 
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fractionalization with AFDC/TANF payments. As the results given in Table 7 indicate, monthly 
AFDC/TANF payment is minimized when EFI=0.50 and it is minimized when RFI=0.63 which 
again fall in the middle-part of the range of observed values of EFI (0.03; 0.90) and RFI (0.18; 
0.87).5 Figure 10 and Figure 11 show the negative relationships between the polarization 
indices and the AFDC/TANF payments. The U-shaped relationships between the 
fractionalization indices and the AFDC/TANF payments are shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13.  
 The only control variable Alesina and Glaeser (2004) use is the annual median income 
in each state. They find that if annual state median income rises by $100, monthly payment 
rises by almost $1.50 per month. Our results are very close to theirs. We find that if annual state 
income rises by $100, monthly payment rises by almost $1.   
 
4. Conclusion 
The root causes of income inequality continue to be among the most challenging 
questions in economics literature. In this study we analyze the direct and indirect effects of 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income inequality. When we use the polarization index as 
our measure of heterogeneity, we find a positive and linear relationship between ethnic and 
religious heterogeneity and the Gini coefficient and a negative and linear relationship between 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity and AFDC/TANF payments. When we use the 
fractionalization index as our measure of heterogeneity we find an inverse-U shaped 
relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and the Gini coefficient, and a U-
shaped relationship between ethnic and religious heterogeneity and AFDC/TANF payments. 
                                                 
 5 While the estimated coefficients of EPI2 are statistically significant at the 1 percent level in all 
specifications, the estimated coefficients of RPI2 are not significant at all.  
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According to our estimations, ethnic and religious polarization explain almost 37% of 
the variation in the Gini coefficients across states (close to 75% when control variables are 
included) and almost 10% of the variation in AFDC/TANF payments (close to 65% when 
control variables are included). Similarly, fractionalization explains almost 40% of the variation 
in Gini coefficients (close to 80% when control variables are included) and almost 20% of the 
variation in AFDC/TANF payments (close to 65% when control variables are included). 
The role of ethnic and religious groups within the distribution process increased 
significantly in the last decade. According to the National Congregations Study, 57 percent of 
congregations engage in redistributive activities. 11 percent have clothing projects, 18 percent 
have housing/shelter projects, and 33 percent have food-related projects. Of the congregations 
engaged in some level of activity, 90 percent support at least one activity with volunteers. The 
median amount spent by congregations directly in support of redistributive activities is $1200 
representing about 3 percent of a congregation’s total budget. The engagement of the religious 
groups is likely to increase further as several states establish programs that encourage religious 
groups to apply for funding. California, for example, recently launched a faith-based initiative 
that dedicated up to $5 million in grants to religious groups for employment assistance 
programs (Chaves 2001). As Chaves (2001) argues, there is much to say about these efforts. 
“They raise legal, moral, theological, and sociological questions, all of which deserve close 
attention” (Chaves 2001, 122). This study clearly adds economic perspectives and questions to 
the other ones. 
There are, of course many questions thrown up by our analysis and a number of 
pathways are opened for future research. It necessarily has shortcomings, not least those which 
are induced by data deficiencies. Nevertheless, the already conclusive nature of our early results 
indicates that deeper analysis of this issue is worthwhile. Provided that the data are available, it 
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will definitely be interesting for example to analyze the effects of heterogeneity on within-
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Table 1. Highest and lowest 5 states 
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Table 2. Pairwise correlations of income inequality and heterogeneity measures 
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0.55 1.00    
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0.39 0.36 1.00   
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0.45 0.94 0.34 1.00  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 














0.48 0.24 0.06 0.91 
RPI 
 
0.58 0.10 0.33 0.80 
EFI 
 
0.28 0.17 0.03 0.90 
RFI 
 
0.69 0.15 0.18 0.87 
Female Head 
 
0.11 0.02 0.07 0.17 
Young 
 
0.26 0.02 0.07 0.17 
Age 
 
0.13 0.02 0.04 0.18 
College 
 
0.22 0.04 0.12 0.33 
Minimum Wage 
 
3.68 0.30 3.35 4.84 
AFDC/TANF 
 
344.63 142.10 118 846 
Unemployment  
Insurance 
210.63 42.86 134 328.19 
Unemployment 
Rate 
6.25 1.69 2.73 12.11 
Union 
 
0.14 0.06 0.03 0.30 
Corruption 
 
0.30 0.17 0.04 0.85 
GSP Growth 
 









Table 4. SUR Estimation: Polarization and Inequality 
 
 Gini Gini Gini 
Intercept for the 1980s 0.337 0.304 0.321 
 (0.042)*** (0.044)*** (0.044)*** 
Intercept for the 1990s 0.351 0.315 0.334 
 (0.043)*** (0.045)*** (0.045)*** 
EPI 0.029  0.026 
 (0.011)***  (0.011)** 
RPI  0.029 0.018 
  (0.016)* (0.016) 
Female Head 0.259 0.443 0.259 
 (0.120)** (0.092)*** (0.119)** 
Young -0.065 -0.080 -0.065 
 (0.085) (0.087) (0.085) 
Old 0.278 0.257 0.284 
 (0.099)*** (0.101)** (0.098)*** 
College 0.042 0.100 0.054 
 (0.049) (0.047)** (0.049) 
Minimum Wage 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
AFDC/TANF -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.002)** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Unemployment Insurance 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Unemployment Rate 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
GSP Growth -0.099 -0.106 -0.101 
 (0.089) (0.093)** (0.090) 
Union -0.039 -0.036 -0.037 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) 
Corruption 0.012 0.013 0.012 
 (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.006)** 
South -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Midwest -0.009 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
West -0.008 0.003 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Observations 50, 50 50, 50 50, 50 
R-squared 0.78, 0.74 0.74, 0.73 0.77, 0.74 
ρ 0.74 0.73 0.72 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.




Table 5. SUR Estimation: Fractionalization and Inequality 
 
 Gini Gini Gini 
Intercept for the 1980s 0.329 0.295 0.305 
 (0.042)*** (0.049)*** (0.049)*** 
Intercept for the 1990s 0.344 0.306 0.319 
 (0.043)*** (0.050)*** (0.049)*** 
EFI 0.095  0.096 
 (0.030)***  (0.030)*** 
EFI2 -0.077  -0.088 
 (0.033)**  (0.033)** 
RFI  0.108 0.081 
  (0.057)* (0.058) 
RFI2  -0.100 -0.080 
  (0.049)** (0.050) 
Female Head 0.261 0.424 0.234 
 (0.109)** (0.098)*** (0.113)** 
Young -0.050 -0.077 -0.059 
 (0.084) (0.093) (0.089) 
Old 0.297 0.261 0.318 
 (0.098)*** (0.100)*** (0.096)*** 
College 0.029 0.098 0.045 
 (0.048) (0.047)** (0.048) 
Minimum Wage 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
AFDC/TANF -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Unemployment Insurance 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Unemployment Rate 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
GSP Growth -0.099 -0.115 -0.133 
 (0.089) (0.096) (0.094) 
Union -0.040 -0.039 -0.036 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) 
Corruption 0.012 0.013 0.011 
 (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.005)** 
South -0.009 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Midwest -0.010 -0.000 -0.004 
 (0.005)* (0.007) (0.007) 
West -0.009 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 50, 50 50, 50 50, 50 
R-squared 0.77, 0.75 0.75, 0.73 0.79, 0.76 
ρ 0.72 0.74 0.72 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6. SUR Estimation: Polarization and AFDC/TANF 
 
 AFDC/TANF AFDC/TANF AFDC/TANF 
Intercept for the 1980s 344.556 370.605 322.316 
 (243.388) (275.668) (260.270) 
Intercept for the 1990s 246.382 277.283 231.164 
 (248.698) (279.893) (264.245) 
EPI -196.457  -188.161 
 (47.091)***  (50.937)*** 
RPI  -207.863 -43.323 
  (114.199)* (114.247) 
Young -601.359 -783.149 -529.747 
 (497.329) (545.334) (505.900) 
Old -1056.288 -429.607 -949.779 
 (712.196) (761.391) (719.099) 
Median Income (1002) 1106.86 744.920 880.780 
 (265.550)*** (225.44)*** (209.260)*** 
Union 640.619 737.484 642.112 
 (195.524)*** (214.099)*** (195.789)*** 
Observations 50, 50 50, 50 50, 50 
R-squared 0.67, 0.54 0.55, 0.47 0.67, 0.54 
ρ 0.83 0.84 0.82 






























Table 7. SUR Estimation: Fractionalization and AFDC/TANF 
 
 AFDC/TANF AFDC/TANF AFDC/TANF 
Intercept for the 1980s 394.190 518.962 529.301 
 (236.134)* (311.021)* (284.589) 
Intercept for the 1990s 305.429 428.429 441.761 
 (239.465) (316.067) (288.514) 
EFI -817.320  -789.540 
 (173.482)***  (176.613)*** 
EFI2 820.225  864.577 
 (218.248)***  (220.231)*** 
RFI  -783.815 -379.354 
  (429.806)* (406.918) 
RFI2  617.469 305.236 
  (353.756)* (336.981) 
Young -616.600 -865.171 -696.619 
 (495.665) (547.953) (506.198) 
Old -1024.054 -471.726 -1023.389 
 (682.560) (762.905) (686.187) 
Median Income (1002) 837.400 699.260 796.980 
 (195.040)*** (234.530)*** (207.530)*** 
Union 620.567 780.451 643.042 
 (190.776)*** (215.685)*** (192.844)*** 
Observations 50, 50 50, 50 50, 50 
R-squared 0.67, 0.61 0.55, 0.48 0.66, 0.62 
ρ 0.82 0.85 0.82 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
